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The Dynamic Effects of U.S. Food Aid
ABSTRACT
Although food aid may have important medium-to-long term effects, there is a glaring absence
of empirical research on food aid dynamics.  This paper applies vector autoregression methods to data
from 18 countries over the period 1961-95.  We find evidence that food aid has a pronounced J-curve
effect on recipient country per capita commercial food imports, but only negligible negative effects
on recipient country per capita food production.  The commercial export gains are primarily enjoyed,
however, by the donors’ competitors, revealing heretofore unrecognized positive pecuniary trade
externalities associated with foreign assistance. 
The authors are associate professor at Cornell University, graduate student at the University
of California-Davis, and professor at Utah State University, respectively.  The paper was first drafted
while all three were at Utah State.  Seniority of authorship is shared equally by Barrett and
Mohapatra.  1
I.  INTRODUCTION
The effects of United States food aid on recipient country agriculture have been heatedly
debated for years.  Does food aid depress producer incentives, thereby retarding output growth?
Does it substitute for food that would otherwise be imported commercially from the donor, thereby
providing balance of payments relief?  Does food aid have long-run stimulative effects on recipient
country commercial imports, thereby developing markets for donors?  Are there pecuniary
commercial trade externalities caused by food aid, wherein the donor captures either more or less than
the marginal increase in recipient country commercial food imports that food aid induces?  Although
food aid may have important medium-to-long term effects, there is a glaring absence of empirical
research on these questions using dynamic modeling techniques.  We apply vector autoregression
methods to a 1961-1995 panel of data on food production, food trade and program food aid
shipments from the United States—by far the world’s largest bilateral food aid donor—for the 18
countries that have most benefitted from U.S. food aid over the past 40+ years.  This analysis
uncovers important, intuitive multiyear patterns not previously identified in the vast literature on food
aid. 
II.  THE ISSUES
Food aid was formalized in the United States in 1954 under Public Law 480 (PL480), the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (later renamed Food for Peace).
1  Title II
(emergency) aid is distributed for humanitarian purposes through charities.  Titles I and III, program
food aid, provide food on concessional  terms that recipient governments then sell to earn revenue
(counterpart funds).  Program (nonemergency) food aid represents the lion’s share of food aid
shipments, historically about 80% of direct, bilateral food aid.  Compared to Title II, program food2
aid is more fungible, more commonly used for broader development purposes by recipients and for
trade promotion purposes by donors, and its effectiveness and desirability is more contested.  We
study program food aid in this paper, hereafter referring to it simply as “food aid” for the sake of
brevity.
The multiple, sometimes conflicting objectives of food aid have sparked heated debate over
its efficacy in promoting either agricultural development in recipient economies or trade development
for donors.  Particularly intense debates have surrounded the questions of whether food aid (1) is
“additional” to commercial trade volumes, as the international food aid convention insists, (2)
establishes distribution channels and fosters consumer taste for donor country products, thereby
stimulating long-term commercial trade, or (3) depresses or stimulates recipient country food
production.  There are no unambiguous analytical answers to these questions; they demand empirical
investigation.  While there are other conceptual debates in the literature—and many over operational
details—we restrict our attention to these three fundamental issues. 
The primary question to donor country agricultural producers is whether food aid creates
additional commercial export opportunities.  Under international aid agreements, food aid recipient
countries are obliged to maintain a “normal” volume of commercial food imports (the “usual
marketing requirement” or UMR) so as to ensure the “additionality” of food aid.  If the additionality
principle is honored, Acker [1989, 165] observes that “food aid programs provide an opportunity to
empty granaries and warehouses, build up taste preferences for US commodities, and through the
economic development consequences of our PL 480 programs, build purchasing power for future
commercial sales of US agricultural commodities.”  However, as researchers such as Abbott and
McCarthy [1982] and Von Braun and Huddleston [1988] note, food aid commonly seems to3
substitute in part for commercial imports, violating the additionality principle.   Producer groups’ and
legislators’ concerns revolve around whether food aid offers a reasonable rate of return on
investment, and whether it implicitly subsidizes trade promotion for competitors (e.g., the European
Community) who sell similar products on world markets. 
Additionality also affects recipient country development since violations of additionality imply
relaxation of balance of payments constraints, which may be crucial to macroeconomic stabilization
efforts central to long-run economic growth and development. Another concern for most recipient
countries is whether food aid depresses or stimulates domestic output.  Schultz [1960] argued that
food aid augments domestic supply, thereby depressing prices and creating disincentives for local
producers.  Others argue, however, that recipient economies are price takers in international markets,
restricting the price-reducing effects of food aid.  Bounded output price reductions might then be
overshadowed by the stimulative effects of increased intermediate goods (e.g., fertilizer, machinery)
imports made possible by prospective violations of additionality, which could induce real exchange
rate appreciation and thereby lower imported input prices.  Mohapatra et al. [1996] show that even
in relatively simple models, food aid’s incentive effects on factor and product markets are ambiguous.
Perhaps some of the disagreement over food aid reflects unstated differences in the time
frames commentators have in mind.  For instance, while additionality might not hold because of
substitution effects, thereby depressing donor commercial exports in the short run, food aid might
nonetheless generate long-run increases in recipient country food imports through habit-formation
and the development of distribution channels.  This hypothesis suggests a J-curve response of
commercial food trade to food aid shocks, with a short-term decrease in commercial transactions
followed by long-run net increases.  Similarly, food aid might generate immediate, Schultzian output4
price disincentives that lead to a short-run decrease in recipient country food production, while
improved nutrition and increased intermediate imports generate lagged positive effects that mitigate
or offset the product market disincentive effects of food aid.  This too would generate a J-curve
pattern in the time path of food production response to food aid deliveries.  Although the key
questions surrounding food aid concern multiyear horizons, and conflicting claims may be
reconcilable in ways like those just hypothesized, no study to date has considered the dynamics of
food aid’s effects on production and trade in recipient economies. 
III.  METHODS
Given the dynamic but unknown relationship between food aid, production, and commercial
imports, the logical way to proceed is with dynamic estimation imposing as few restrictions as
possible, i.e., with vector autoregression (VAR).
2  A VAR represents the reduced form of a general
dynamic structural econometric model of the form: 
AX = BX(L) + Ce [1]
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where X is the dependent variable vector comprised of food aid, F, commercial food imports, M, and
food production, P, and e is the mutually orthogonal white noise structural innovation vector (eF , eM,
eP).  X(L) is a matrix polynomial of order p in the lag operator L (for a p
th order autoregressive
structure).  Matrices A and C capture the contemporaneous feedback interactions in the system.  B
represents system dynamics.  The indeterminacy of the system is eliminated by normalizing the
diagonal elements of A and C to unity.  The reduced form of [1] is 
X = RX(L) + , [2]
where R is the reduced form parameter matrix(A
-1B), and , is the reduced form innovation vector (A
-5
1Ce), with variance E.  Assuming the primitive e vector was white noise, it follows that the reduced
form stochastic disturbance terms (,F, ,M, ,P) have zero means  and are individually serially
uncorrelated.  With unrestricted dynamics and appropriately specified lags, equation [2] represents
a standard VAR process. 
Rather than obtaining identification by a Choleski decomposition of the covariance matrix of
reduced form errors, we use the theory and practice of program food aid to restrict the
contemporaneous coefficient matrix, A, and exactly identify the system of equations in [1].  Program
food aid (perhaps unlike humanitarian aid) is typically requisitioned nine or so months prior to
delivery and thus is effectively exogenous to contemporaneous production or import shocks.
Commercial imports, in contrast, can be affected by contemporaneous shocks to both production and
food aid deliveries since commercial trade requires considerably less lead time than does program
food aid transfer.  Production, meanwhile, could well be affected by contemporaneous shocks to food
aid deliveries since these are known in advance and can affect the availability of imported inputs
insofar as aid mitigates binding balance of payments constraints.  Shocks to commercial food imports,
on the other hand, tend not to be known ahead of time and are thus unlikely to affect production
volumes, given the biological lags in food production.  This logic dictates the restrictions we impose






We expect "21 to be nonpositive, reflecting contemporaneous substitution of food aid for
commercial food imports (i.e., violation of the additionality principle).  We likewise expect6
contemporaneous  production ("23) to be negatively associated with commercial imports, since
increased domestic output reduces excess domestic food demand.  The contemporaneous effect of
food aid on domestic production, "31, could be either positive or negative. 
The restrictions imposed in [3] correspond to the innovation model
,Ft = et Ft [4]
,Mt = "21,Ft + eMt + "23,Pt
,Pt = "31,Ft + ePt
Using initial estimates of the reduced form coefficients and ,, we generate full information
maximum-likelihood estimates of A and S, then trace the expected time paths of variables using the
relationship e = A,. 
We selected lag lengths so as to minimize the number of parameters estimated without
misspecifying the model.  Toward this end, we performed block exogeneity tests—a multivariate
generalization of the Granger causality test — to establish which lagged variables Granger cause
other dependent variables in [1].
3  We used five annual lags of each variable (i.e., sixteen total
regressors per equation, including a constant) as the unrestricted system against which we tested
more parsimonious specifications.  Candidate specifications were generated through application of
the Akaike Information Criterion to each regression.  From among these, a block exogeneity test






























We estimated the resulting VAR by the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) method.
5
IV.  THE DATA
USDA generously provided the food aid flows data of Suarez [1994], disaggregated by
commodity, recipient country, year and source (PL480 Titles I, II or III).  From these data we
constructed time series of cereals program food aid (Titles I and III) delivery volumes to each
country, 1961-1995.  Cereals food aid accounts for more than 90% of world food aid, so cereals
serve as a reasonable proxy for overall trends in food aid.
6  We use data from the eighteen countries
that most frequently received program food aid from the United States over this period: Bangladesh,
Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Republic of Korea,
Morocco, Peru, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tunisia, and Zaire.  Commercial cereals
import volume data come from the FAO’s Trade Yearbook and data on cereals production volumes
are from the FAO’s Production Yearbook.  All volume figures were converted to a per capita basis
using annual population data reported in the latter publication. 
Figure 1 displays a plot of the cross-sectional annual mean per capita volumes for cereals
production, commercial imports and food aid deliveries in the eighteen recipient economies.  While
per capita production has remained fairly constant at about 140 kilograms per capita, program food
aid volumes have declined sharply, from almost 20 kg per capita in the 1960s to less than 10 in the
1990s.  Commercial cereals imports, meanwhile, have risen from less than 50 kg per capita in the
early 1960s to nearly 100 kg per capita in the 1990s.  Clearly trade is more than replacing aid in these
nations, but do past food aid distributions help account for any of the growth in cereals trade
volumes?  8
V.  ESTIMATION RESULTS
While we are interested in the coefficients of the structural relationship represented in
equation [1], the real motivation of this work focuses on the dynamic effects of food aid on recipient
country food production and commercial imports.  Does food aid retard or stimulate recipient country
food production and does it make or take away commercial markets for the donor?  We therefore
follow up estimation of the dynamic system in equations [5]-[7] with innovation accounting.  The
Wold decomposition theorem enables representation of the VAR process as a vector moving average
process that offers some insights on dependent variables’ dynamic responses to shocks to the system.
Impulse response functions trace the effect of an innovation in one variable on the others.  Variance
decomposition offers complementary information on the relative importance of shocks to one variable
on the forecast errors of the other dependent variables. 
Since we are using panel data, it is also important to consider whether there may be country-
specific unobserved heterogeneity.  Toward this end we tested for both fixed effects and cross-
sectional heteroskedasticity.  An F test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the intercepts are
identical across countries in equations [5]-[7].  On the other hand, likelihood ratio tests for groupwise
heteroskedasticity consistently reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity.  In recognition that the
autoregressive specification of equations [5]-[7] might not have removed all autocorrelation, we also
tested for serial correlation using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.  The food aid equation still evinces
autocorrelation.  We therefore use the Newey-West (1987) estimator to derive a positive, semi-
definite, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix for the parameter
estimates.
7 
The structural parameter estimates recovered from SUR estimation of the VAR are reported9
in Table I.
8  The results are consistent with theory.  Program food aid clearly violates the full
additionality principle, as the partial correlation between a ton of aid per capita and contemporaneous
commercial food imports per capita is -0.86.  This suggests that, on average, food aid adds yields
little additional food consumption.  The implied aggregate marginal propensity to consume food out
of a food aid transfer is in the range of consensus microeconometric estimates of Engel curves.
9
Contemporaneous production increases likewise decrease commercial imports, as one would expect.
Interestingly, the estimated partial correlation between food aid  inflows and contemporaneous food
production in recipient economies is positive, although statistically insignificant.  Given the apparent
balance of payments effects of food aid reflected in "21, perhaps this signals that contemporaneous
factor market price effects dominate contemporaneous output market price effects in recipient
country food agriculture.
10 
Figure 2 depicts the impulse response functions of commercial food imports, food production
and U.S. food aid to a one kilogram per capita shock to U.S. food aid shipments.  The J-curve effect
of food aid on commercial food imports is clear in this graphic.  An increase in food aid volumes
initially reduces commercial food trade volumes, violating the full additionality principle, but
ultimately (by the fifth year) yields a net increase in commercial imports, thanks most likely to induced
shifts in consumer tastes, income effects, and reduced transactions costs caused by the development
of distribution channels.  In the short-run, program food aid indeed takes away donor export markets
abroad, but in the longer run it appears to foster market development for food exporters. 
Although the partial correlation between food aid and food production is positive, once all
the effects are accounted for in the impulse response function, a food aid shock of one kilogram per
capita decreases contemporaneous production, but these negative effects dissipate over time, with10
production ultimately stabilizing at a level modestly below that prevailing prior to the shock to food
aid.  Thus, there appear to be Schultzian effects, albeit never especially serious and dissipating over
time.  Finally, food aid shows considerable persistence; the half life on food aid flows is better than
seven years in these data.
11  Combined, the impulse response functions in Figure 2 support an
interpretation that food aid impacts primarily trade, fostering greater food import reliance by recipient
countries, both through further food aid flows in the short term and commercial imports in the
medium-to-long term.  Given that consumption equals production plus net imports, assuming no
change in stocks, the impulse response functions suggest that food aid stimulates increased food
consumption in recipient economies, albeit entirely through aid and trade, not local production. 
It is important, however, to note that food aid accounts for relatively little of the forecast
error variance in either commercial food imports or food production (Table II), reflecting the
considerable difference in magnitudes of these volumes.  The mean aid volume in sample (12.5 kg per
capita) is only 9% and 17% of mean production and commercial import volumes, respectively.  So
while the conditional expectations of food aid’s effects on commercial imports and recipient country
output follow the J-curve and Schultzian patterns, respectively (Figure 2), food aid does not drive
recipient country production or trade patterns. 11
VI.  DO U.S. EXPORTERS BENEFIT FROM FOOD AID?
The estimation results above suggest that the primary effects of food aid on recipient country
food agriculture are to stimulate further food aid in the near-term (roughly five years) and to stimulate
commercial imports in the longer run (beyond five years, after passing through the trough of the J
curve effect).  However, that analysis uses aggregate commercial trade volumes; it does not
necessarily follow that U.S. food aid promotes U.S. exports.  The impulse response functions in
Figure 2 may mask pecuniary externalities associated with food aid and trade.  For example, perhaps
food aid somehow ties a recipient to the donor, thereby inducing substitution of commercial imports
from the donor for commercial imports from the rest of the world (i.e., negative externalities).
Alternatively, it could be that food aid—a form of income transfer—stimulates demand for other
products, including other cereals, thereby stimulating demand for commercial food imports from the
rest of the world (a positive externality).  There is no a priori theoretical reason why there must be
an externality, or one of any particular sign; again, this is an empirical question. 
We employ the same method to study this question, now dividing the commercial cereals
imports data into two series: commercial imports from the United States (MUS) and from the rest of
the world (MROW).  The economic logic behind the earlier restrictions imposed on the A matrix carry
over, but there is no particular reason to expect MROW to influence MUS unidirectionally, nor vice
versa.  As it turns out, we estimated the VAR under both specifications and found qualitatively
identical and statistically insignificantly different results.  So here we report the results derived using
a specification for A that allows contemporaneous, unidirectional effects from MUS to MROW.  We use
the same lag structure as before; the prior specification was chosen so as to yield parsimony and white
noise residuals and to pass the block exogeneity test for this system of equations as well. 12
The structural estimation results for the estimated A matrix are found in Table III.  These
again show negative partial correlations between food aid and contemporaneous trade, signaling a
violation of the principle of additionality, although the estimate is statistically significantly different
from zero only for MROW.  As before, however, our principal interest concerns the dynamic effects
of food aid, and thus in the impulse response functions derived from the estimated model.  Figure 3
shows precisely the sort of food aid persistence and quite modestly negative effects on food
production we found before.  By splitting the commercial imports series into MUS and MROW,
however, we find evidence of strong positive externality effect of U.S. food aid on ROW commercial
food exports to recipient countries.  An increase in food aid continues to have a J-curve effect on
U.S. commercial food shipments to the recipient country, but we estimate that it takes better than
twenty years to recover from the initial violation of additionality.  U.S. program food aid appears to
substitute for U.S. commercial sales for quite some time. 
Meanwhile, foreign food exporters face only short-term losses from U.S. food aid shipments.
From the fifth year on, the impulse response of commercial imports from ROW is consistently
positive.  In the medium-term (3-10 years), U.S. food aid shipments beget mainly further food aid
from the U.S., at significant commercial cost.  Over the decade following a positive food aid shock,
annual U.S. commercial food export volumes to the recipient country fall by an expected 55% of the
amount of the initial food aid shock (i.e., food aid replaces exports at almost a 2:1 rate), while annual
food aid flows continue at 69% of the level of the initial shock.  American largesse appears to
stimulate recipient country demand for commercial food shipments from the donor’s trade
competitors.  Over the decade following a positive shock to U.S. food aid, ROW commercial food
exports to the recipient country increase by 18% of the shock volume, on average.  As a13
consequence, U.S. investments in program food aid yield a negative internal rate of return, measured
in terms of real effects on U.S. commercial exports (Table IV).
12  For the world as a whole,
however—i.e., looking at U.S. food aid’s effects on aggregate commercial food export volumes to
the recipient, not just on U.S. commercial exports— the internal rate of return is reasonably attractive
at horizons of 20 years or longer: 7-10% per annum, on average.  This suggests the presence of
significant bilateral food aid externality effects, wherein trade promotion gains to temporary
investments in food aid are enjoyed broadly, while the trade-displacing costs of aid flows are borne
primarily by the donor.  This may help explain why OECD nations deliver only a fraction of their
common and longstanding bilateral aid targets.  It also suggests an important role for multilateral
efforts to internalize these externalities, i.e., replacing bilateral program food aid with multilateral
distribution through the World Food Programme, as has gradually occurred for donors other than the
United States. 
This is a novel and potentially important result.  Our interpretation of the trade externality
effect of food aid is that there are two forces at work.  First, donor and competitor cereals are not
perfect substitutes (i.e., they have finite Armington elasticities), so the implicit income transfer in food
aid induces expanded demand for competitors’ cereals exports.  Second, PL480 food aid shipments
exhibit considerable persistence.  Aid flows fall only 3% over the subsequent three years and have a
half-life of seven years, consistent with Barrett’s [1998] finding that the probability of a PL480
recipient receiving further food aid shipments, conditional on the number of years’ delivery to date,
is greater than 0.9 at all horizons out to 25 years.  Since food aid partly substitutes for
contemporaneous commercial food imports from the donor, the persistence of food aid translates into
persistent substitution of aid for trade in the donor-recipient relationship. 14
VII.  CONCLUSION
In this paper we estimated the dynamic relationship between U.S. program food aid,
commercial food trade and recipient country food production using 35 years’ data from 18 recipient
countries.  This is the first attempt at modeling these relationships statistically yields several
suggestive findings having implications for international food aid and trade policy. 
We find no evidence that U.S. program food aid (PL480 Titles I and III) significantly
stimulates food production in recipient economies.  Given that agricultural output expansion is central
to the agrarian transformation of most low- and middle-income countries, this seems an indicator that
perhaps program food aid offers little if any stimulus to recipient country development.  If anything,
the data support the Schultzian critique that food aid discourages recipient country production in the
short run. 
Like most previous researchers, we find a negative and statistically significant
contemporaneous relationship between per capita food aid deliveries and recipients’ per capita
commercial food import volumes. However, there is a lagged positive response of per capita
commercial food shipments to food aid deliveries, yielding a J-curve relationship between these
variables, as evident in the estimated impulse response functions.   Shocks to per capita food aid
volumes appear to decrease per capita commercial transactions initially, then increase them over
longer horizons of five to 20 years.  
Although this aggregate J-curve delivers an attractive internal rate of return to world
commercial exports at the twenty year horizon, the return to the United States exclusively is negative
throughout the period of our analysis due to significant (and heretofore unrecognized) positive
externality effects of U.S. program food aid on commercial food shipments from other countries.15
U.S. food aid shipments persist at high levels for many years after a positive shock to food aid flows
and have the effect of significantly reducing commercial exports over the ensuing decade.  It is
nonetheless also clear from the variance decompositions that program food aid shocks are not the
driving force behind either output or trade patterns, because food aid volumes are tiny relative to
recipient country production or trade volumes.  In summary, we find that U.S. program food aid does
not contribute significantly to either recipient country development or donor commercial exports. 16
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1. See Maxwell and Singer [1979], Ruttan [1993], or Barrett [forthcoming] for surveys. 
2. Sims [1980], Blanchard [1989], Lütkepohl [1993], Hamilton [1994], and Enders [1995]
provide excellent summaries of VAR methods and motivations. 
3. See Hamilton [1994] or Enders [1995] for technical details on the block exogeneity test.
4. The block exogeneity test statistic is 14.78, which has a p-value of 0.54 on the P
2 distribution,
with a null hypothesis that the two models are statistically equivalent. 
5. Both augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests rejected the null hypothesis of a unit
root in the dependent variables.  So equations [5]-[7] are estimated in levels. 
6. We aggregated volumes (metric tons) across the following commodities:  barley, bulgur
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wheat (0.96), corn, cornmeal (0.56), corn-soy-milk(0.88), mixed feed grains, oats, rice, rye,
sorghum, wheat, wheat flour grain equivalent, and wheat-flour-soy (.80).  The numbers in
parentheses are the grain equivalent conversion factors under the food aid convention. 
7. The full suite of diagnostic test results are available from the authors by request. 
8. The reduced form model estimates are available from the authors by request, as are
complementary, direct three stage least squares estimates of [1].  The latter, reported in
Barrett, Mohapatra, and Snyder [1998] yield qualitatively identical results. 
9. Strauss and Thomas [1995] and Barrett [forthcoming] discuss this literature in more detail.
10. Mohapatra et al. [1996] demonstrate that substitution of food aid for commercial food
imports may reduce the price of imported intermediate inputs due to endogenous real
exchange rate appreciation. 
11. See also Barrett [1998] on food aid dependency dynamics. 
12. We treat this as if the initial violation of additionality were an investment expected to yield
a stream of future payoffs for which the internal rate of return is a function of the sequence
of annual impulse responses in commercial trade per capita. 20
Table I
Estimated Contemporaneous Food Aid-Production-Commercial Trade Relations
          Regressors                   
Dependent Variables    [F] [M] [P]
Food Aid [F] 1 0 0
Commercial Imports [M] -0.860  1 -0.100
(0.111) (0.059)
Production [P] 0.194  0 1
 (0.130)
Standard errors in parentheses. 21
Table II
Variance Decomposition Percentages of Forecast Errors at Different Leads
   Commercial Food Imports              Food Production          
Lead (years)  F M P  F M P
5 0.4 49.9 49.7 0.4 0.1 99.5
10 0.7 51.2 48.1 0.4 0.2 99.4
15 1.6 52.4 46.0 0.4 0.5 99.222
Table III
Contemporaneous Food Aid-Production—U.S. and ROW Commercial Trade Relations
                                          Regressors
Dependent Variables [F] [MROW] [P] [MUS]
F 1 0 0 0
MROW -0.295 1 0.137 1.412
(0.108) (0.149) (0.151)
P 0.138 0 1 0
(0.149)
MUS -0.296 0 0.286 1
(0.375) (0.112)
Standard errors in parentheses. 23
Table IV
Expected Internal Rates of Return on U.S. Program Food Aid
(Change in commercial export volume as percent return on initial investment in food aid)
Period Aggregate Returns* Returns to the U.S.
Up to 10 years Negative Negative
15 years 0.2% Negative
20 years 7.1% Negative
25 years 9.6% Negative
30 years 10.6% Negative
*Sum of impulse responses of commercial imports from ROW and United States.24
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Figure 2
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